Jocelyn Ledward KC and Fiona Robertson were instructed to intervene on behalf of the Attorney General in the appeal of Liam Óg Ó Hannaidh.
Mr Ó Hannaidh, a member of the Irish rap group Kneecap, was charged with displaying an article arousing reasonable suspicion of support for a proscribed organisation, following his display of a Hezbollah flag at a gig in London on 21 November 2024. This is a summary-only offence, contrary to section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which requires the consent of the Attorney General where the offence is wholly or partly connected with the affairs of a country other than the UK.
The CPS charged Mr Ó Hannaidh by way of written charge and requisition on 21 May 2025, the day on which the six month time limit expired. The CPS did not, however, seek and obtain the consent of the Attorney General until the following day, 22 May 2025, which was outside the 6 month time limit. The defence, therefore, argued at first instance that the proceedings were a nullity and the Chief Magistrate agreed. No new charge could be issued and tried because the 6 month time limit had expired.
The DPP sought to appeal the Chief Magistrate’s ruling by way of case stated to the High Court. Jocelyn Ledward KC and Fiona Robertson were instructed to intervene in the appeal on behalf of the Attorney General in a neutral capacity in order to assist the court as to the relevant principles raised in the exercise of the Attorney General’s wider functions in the public interest.
The DPP sought to argue that the point at which proceedings were “instituted” for the purposes of the Terrorism Act 2000 should be determined under the terms of that Act, not by s.29 CJA 2003 and, therefore, that the proceedings were “instituted” when the person charged came to court to answer the charge.
Delivering the judgment of the court, Lord Justice Edis observed that the written charge and requisition process under s.29 CJA 2003 presented an entirely new way of initiating criminal proceedings which applied not only to summary offences but also to much more serious crime. Where an offence instituted without the appropriate consent is either way or indictable only it will be possible to continue to prosecute the case by starting again from the point where the proceedings were a nullity because of the lack of consent with law officer permission. It is, therefore, only in respect of summary offences that the issue becomes critical because of the 6 month time limit for summary only offences. The Court observed that there is a significant policy objective in that provision - summary offences are supposed to be dealt with summarily because they are less serious than other classes of case the time limit is in place to promote that objective. Edis LJ concluded it would be “quite wrong to adopt strained and unnatural constructions of plain words in primary legislation in order to save one summary only case from the application of that important time limit.”
It was observed that while it may be thought to be a recipe for confusion to have a different rule on what can validly be done before consent with law officer permission is given depending on whether the proceedings are begun by written charge, summons or a charge in the police station, and on whether the offence charged is triable only on indictment, either way, or summary only. However, in mitigation of that confusion, the Court pointed out that the only persons who must comply with these requirements are the DPP and the Attorney General, who are sophisticated users of the justice system, supported by expert staff.
The Court concluded that there is no reason why the Terrorism Act should be construed any more generously than s.27 of the 1986 Act and there is no reason why the word “instituted” in section 117(2)(a) of TACT should be construed so that it has any different meaning from the word “institute” in section 29(1) of the CJA 2003.
The appeal was, therefore, dismissed with the Court agreeing with the Chief Magistrate that proceedings had been instituted when the first written charge was issued on 21 May 2025. This was invalid as the permission of the Attorney General had not been obtained at that time – accordingly, the Judge was right to hold he had no jurisdiction to try any summary only offence alleged to have been committed on the date in question.
The Court added: “It is a matter of concern that a charge which both the DPP and the Attorney General considered met both parts of the Full Code Test for Crown Prosecutors will never now be determined. There was, they decided, a realistic prospect of conviction and the prosecution was in the public interest. We have not investigated the reasons for this failure and nor do we seek to attribute blame. That is not because these circumstances are not worthy of consideration but because they are irrelevant to our decision. For the purposes of public understanding we should spell out what this means. The respondent has not been tried for his alleged conduct on 21 September 2025 and will not be tried. He has not been convicted, and he has not been acquitted. This decision will be of no benefit to anyone else who finds themselves subject to a written charge alleging an offence contrary to section 13 of TACT, provided that the DPP gives consent to the proceedings against them, where applicable with the permission of the Attorney General, before the written charge is issued, and provided that all that happens within 6 months of the date of the alleged offence.”
The full judgement may be found here:
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/OHannaidh-2026-EWHC-540-Admin.pdf
The case has been widely reported in national press: